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REVISITING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DILEMMA: 
HOW DID WE GET TO A STRONG WTO IPR REGIME? 
Julien Chaisse† & Xinjie Luan‡ 
The increasingly robust protection of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“IPRs”) worldwide stems from the ever-increasing importance of IP-
intensive industries in international environments. However, IPR 
protection and enforcement are bound both by national and 
international IPR-related laws, policies, and practices. Since the 
development of the United States’ IPR system, there has been a 
dramatic transformation of IPR-protection modalities, from a soft one 
based on “monopoly phobia” to a strong one in the absolute sense. The 
United States has made it its aim to strong-arm the negotiations of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS”) provisions to obtain strong IPR protection. As for many 
other World Trade Organization (“WTO”) Members, attending the 
multilateral IPR negotiations and then accepting the negotiating 
results have seemingly become a strategic choice to circumvent the 
United States’ unilateral actions against IPR violations. Considering 
the onerousness of the Doha Round Agenda, it will be significant if 
future TRIPS reforms will avoid the dilemma caused by focusing 
obsessively on strong IPR protection and enforcement.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual properties (“IPs”) or intellectual property rights 
(“IPRs”) have considerable economic and legal importance in 
international trade. IP-intensive imports and exports, IP royalties and 
license fees, IP-related content downloads, and cross-board deliveries 
demonstrate the significance of IPRs.1 In retrospect, there are two 
major policy types of IPR protection and enforcement—i.e., the strong 
one and the weak one. What should be mentioned is that, to some 
extent, the so-called “weak” protection of IPRs concerns sometimes 
“could not” but not “would not”. In other words, weak IP protection is 
a systemic imperfection of IP protection and enforcement in certain 
members of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)—e.g., the Least 
Developed Countries (“LDCs”) sourcing from their lower levels of 
economic and social development, rather than an intentional policy 
alternative.2 
Without contradiction, legal culture should be an integral part of 
the whole ethical culture. In the patent context under the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”), 
																																								 																				
 1. Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/307/Rev.1, 
at 88 (Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Trade Policy Review]. 
 2. Intellectual Property: Balancing Incentives with Competitive Access, in 12 GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 129 (World Bank 2002). 
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established in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) (namely, 
the forerunner of the WTO),3 we can read between the lines that patent 
protection is one of the outstanding objectives under the TRIPS. Part 
III, which is entitled “Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,” 
sets forth the general obligations for IPR enforcement. Article 41 
thereof reads:  
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as 
specified in this Part are available under their law so as to 
permit effective action against any act of infringement of 
intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, 
including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and 
remedies which constitute a deterrent to further 
infringements.4  
Apparently, the “protection” is the core of the cultural ethics of 
the current international intellectual property system. Of these general 
obligations that the WTO members must assume, the first and foremost 
concern is to protect IPRs, whereas boosting transfer of the patent 
technology and follow-up innovation is not specifically mentioned in 
Part III of TRIPS.5 Moreover, “economics is simply too blunt a tool”6 
to discipline the most appropriate scope and boundary of IPR 
protection, and the blockage being solely based on a financial stake is 
no better than balancing the pros and cons of all situations as far as IPR 
benefits are concerned. Innovation and development are no doubt the 
contemporary common focus of WTO members, but it must be stressed 
that intellectual monopoly with excessive IP protection would also 
retard innovation and development.7 Determining the most suitable 
levels of IPR protection is a complex and comprehensive issue, rather 
than a single and simple economic one.8 In fact, through the discussion 
																																								 																				
 3. Catherine Field, Negotiating for the United States, in THE MAKING OF THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT – PERSONAL INSIGHTS FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND NEGOTIATIONS 130 (2015), 
http://bit.do/field-negotiating-for-US. On the ongoing WTO negotiations, see generally Julien 
Chaisse & Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO’s Supremacy in the International Trade 
Order – A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 16 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 9 (2013). 
 4. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 41, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 318 (1994) (emphasis added) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 5. TRIPS, supra note 4, arts. 41-61. 
 6. Alfred Yen, Restoring Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. 
L. REV. 517, 539 (1990). 
 7. Richard A. Spinello, A Case for Intellectual Property Rights, 13 J. ETHICS INFO. TECH. 
277, 281 (2011) (reviewing MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY (2010)). 
 8. For an interesting discussion of the complexity in finding “legislative balance,” see 
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in Section II.A about the developing history of the United States’ IP 
regime, both strong and weak IPR protection regimes can be used in 
combination as a primary governmental guideline and exist in 
reciprocal dependence. 
In this Article, Section I discusses how the United States has 
gradually corrected the mode of strong IPR protection and led global 
engagement on hard IPR protection issues, including through its own 
trade policy tools and multilateral structure—e.g., the negotiation on 
TRIPS and the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (“DSM”) under the 
Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (“DSU”). Section II addresses whether a singular choice of a 
strong or weak IPR protection mode involves a dilemma. The answer 
thereto would be “No!” had no external pressure been exerted by, for 
example, the United States. Lastly, Section III concludes with a 
summary account and discloses that IPR protection is complex and 
cannot be settled in a single, simple fashion. Certainly, it is 
instrumental to review international IPR systems in a less arbitrary 
manner to achieve a significant breakthrough concerning future TRIPS 
reform, in view of a cautionary tale of repeatedly extended deadlines 
for acceptance of the Protocol Amending the TRIPS Agreement. 
I. STRONG IPR PROTECTION: WHO BUT THE UNITED STATES CAN 
LEAD IT?  
It is well known that IPR protection and enforcement have long 
been considered a central part of the United States’ IP-intensive 
economy and of its imports and exports markets.9 The action mode of 
strong IP protection and enforcement in the United States had been 
applied, on the one hand, through its trade policy tools, especially the 
Special 301; and, on the other hand, through internationally multilateral 
regimes, including the DSM of the WTO.10 
	  
																																								 																				
Bryan Druzin, Restraining the Hand of Law: A Conceptual Framework to Shrink the Size of Law, 
117 W. VA. L. REV. 59 (2014) (positing a model to help policymakers find the correct balance 
between regulatory over-invasiveness and insufficient regulation).  
 9. Trade Policy Review Body, supra note 1, at 36.  
 10. U.S. INTELL. PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, 2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (June 2013), http://bit.do/IPEC-2013 . 
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A. Strong IP Protection Through Trade Policy Tools 
In fact, treating the IPR protection as the keynote of IP regimes, 
and therefore fostering IP protection, has existed since the United 
States’ founding in 1776.11 The U.S. Constitution was written in 1787, 
ratified in 1788, and has formally operated since 1789.12 Section 8 of 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution sets forth in part that “[t]he Congress 
shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful arts, 
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive 
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”13 Simply stated, this 
clause stipulates copyright and patent of authors and inventors shall be 
protected by the U.S. laws. Pursuant to which, the first patent and 
copyright acts of the United States were in force as of 1790.14 It is worth 
noting that, in 1777, the slogan “To Counterfeit is DEATH” was 
printed on the Pennsylvania three pence bill, which may represent the 
world’s shortest anti-counterfeiting declaration.15 In fact, currency 
counterfeiting is considered a special kind of piracy.  
When viewed as a whole, the gradual fade of weak IP protection 
stemming from “monopoly phobia”16 in the United States took place 
by the end of the 1970s. The phenomenon was contributed to numerous 
research- and development-intensive technological breakthroughs or 
IP-based innovations. The IP system had become an integral part of the 
United States’ innovation policy framework by that time.  
After the 1970s, strengthening the protection of IPR has gradually 
occupied a dominant position in IP-related bilateral and multilateral 
negotiations, and furthermore, there arose a kind of power or influence 
culture based on the so-called law of the jungle.17 Enactment of the 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”), as of September 9, 2011, 
promoted the most significant regulatory and administrative reforms of 
the last sixty years of U.S. patent protection and enforcement.18 The 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) asserted in an apparent, 
																																								 																				
 11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776). 
 12. The Day The Constitution Was Ratified, NAT’L CONST. CTR. (June 21, 2017), 
http://bit.do/thedayconstitutionratified (last visited Nov. 22, 2017). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8. 
 14. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
 15. John Dunlap, Three Pence Bill (photograph), http://bit.do/threepence (last visited Nov. 
22, 2017). 
 16.  See Beverly W. Pattishall, Trade-Marks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH. L. REV. 
967 (1952). 
 17. The Oxford Living Dictionary defines Law of the Jungle as “the principle that those 
who are strong and apply ruthless self-interest will be most successful”. See Law of the 
Jungle, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARY, http://bit.do/law-of-the-jungle (last visited Sept. 30, 2017). 
 18. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
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aggressive manner that AIA implementation also provided “a renewed 
opportunity to harmonize the international patent system.”19  
Aiming to lead the world in IP protection and policy, the United 
States’ IPR acts have been continuously developed, and moreover, 
there is one great characteristic in these developments—namely, that 
the scope and content of the United States’ IPR protection have been 
extended into new fields. 
It is well known that traditional IP includes patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, and trade secrets. But now geographical indications, new 
plant varieties, layout designs of integrated circuits, software 
copyrights, data pools, trade dress, logos, and so on are all 
encompassed by IP protection. In the meantime, creative industries—
comprising programme, music, electric publishing, audio-visual, 
gaming software, and other large amounts of application and 
entertainment software, and thereby international digital trade 
delivered via the model of transnational digital downloads over the 
Internet—have been developed rapidly in recent years. The value of 
royalties and licensing fees which the United States has obtained 
therefrom increased from $98 billion in 2009 to $130 billion in 2013.20 
Moreover, the United States maintained a huge IP-related trade surplus 
in 2012 and 2013, $84 billion and $88 billion, respectively.21 The 
United States now has a dominant position in these industries and 
trades, and yet it clearly and incisively criticizes internet piracy as 
being “the single most important barrier to digital trade.”22 The United 
States considers it to be a serious problem and imposes on itself the 
central task of strengthening the protection of electrical IPR in 
accordance with the ever-increasing importance of these new economic 
and trade patterns. 
In the meantime, issues like anti-dilution, anti-counterfeiting, and 
geographical indications outreaching rights are developed to be 
independent legislations or to become new topics of international 
multilateral IPR negotiations organized by the IPR Committee of the 
WTO. Thus, the persistent, broad terms of reference of the United 
States’ IP system makes the system per se more complex than ever 
before. In the modern, competitive, and sophisticated economy, a 
stable and organically-organized IPR system will undoubtedly help 
consumers reduce search costs and discover the specific products 
																																								 																				
 19. Global Impacts of the AIA, USPTO, http://bit.do/uspto-global-impacts (last visited 
Sept. 27, 2017). 
 20. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1. 
 21. Id. at 89.  
 22. Id. at 90. 
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which meet their personal preferences or demands. In this respect, it is 
well recognized that an IP with prestige in the marketplace must be 
protected against any misuse by others, which would otherwise 
undermine its distinction and further increase the likelihood of 
confusion.  
Consequently, the anti-dilution significance relating to the famous 
IPR protection has increased over time. The Federal Dilution Act, 
which came into effect in 1996, and the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (“ACTA”)23—signed in October 2011 by eight members 
including Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Korea, and the United States—are two examples 
developing from a special concern about a specific law or agreement. 
The ACTA “reportedly does not require any statutory changes to U.S. 
law”.24 This further shows that the relatively mature IPR system of the 
United States plays a leading and exemplary role in the development 
of international IPR rules, even though the outlook of ACTA is 
uncertain and has not yet been in force to date. 
The strong protection of IPRs, say, putting special emphasis on 
the inventor’s or the owner’s interest protection from anti-
counterfeiting and piracy, has been taken into prior account under the 
U.S. IPR system. Also, in this circumstance, the IPR system in the 
developed country members of the WTO has increasingly been treated 
as a powerful instrument for encouraging innovation and invention.  
For instance, in response to growing demands for license content, 
Spain set up its own patent system for pharmaceuticals in 1992.25 In 
contrast, pharmaceuticals were not incorporated into the Canadian 
patent system until 1993.26 For the sake of strengthening the United 
States’ IPR protection as from the 1970s, the wording “IP protection” 
or “protect IPRs” has gradually lodged itself into the public 
consciousness at the international level.  
It is also well known that legal culture is an indispensable and 
integrative part of American culture, and a complicated system of laws 
																																								 																				
 23. ACTA is an international plurilateral agreement combating the infringement of 
intellectual property rights, counterfeiting, and piracy. It includes provisions on the IPR 
enforcement, especially on civil, criminal, border, and digital environment enforcement measures. 
See European Commission Press Release IP/10/1504, Joint Statement on the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) from All the Negotiating Partners of the Agreement (Nov. 15, 2010).  
 24. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1, at 36.  
 25. See Julien Chaisse, Promises and Pitfalls of the European Union Policy on Foreign 
Investment – How Will the New EU Competence on FDI Affect the Emerging Global Regime?, 15 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 51 (2012). See also Harvey E. Bale, Patent Protection For Pharmaceuticals: A 
Platform For Investment, Markets And Improved Health In The Americas, 
http://bit.do/patentprotectionforpharma (last visited Nov. 22, 2017). 
 26. Bale, supra note 25. 
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affects everyday life in the United States.27 Based on the sheer 
economic and trading scales, along with the size of U.S. domestic 
market, the American legal culture carries weight on a global scale 
(either as deterrence or influence). The well-established IPR regimes 
of the United States form a forceful basis for its own policy output of 
strengthening IPR protection. With the start of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, it was a highly suitable time for considering the IP 
protection problem on a multilateral scale.  
B. Strong IP Protection Through Multilateral Regimes 
Invention, innovation, creativity, and branding—which are 
reflected by means of international registration and the transfer or 
authorizations for use of specific IPs—represent a large amount of 
economic value. This is supported by the fact that international 
royalties and licensing fees for IP-trade reached approximately $300 
billion in 2014.28 In view of both the IP economic value and all the 
participants’ varied requests in the course of negotiations on the TRIPS 
draft, the TRIPS final draft unavoidably covers provisions and 
disciplines linked to conflicting factors—such as grounds for issuing a 
compulsory license, improved IPR protection and enforcement, 
safeguards against unilateral sanctions for infringement of IPRs, 
market access of IP-based goods, promoting transfer of technology 
with patent licensing, etc.29 The international community has also been 
keenly focused on these issues and, in particular, on IPR protection and 
compulsory licensing.  
Different WTO members targeted three concerns in the TRIPS’ 
preamble:  
i) reducing “distortions and impediments to international 
trade”;30  
ii) promoting “effective and adequate protection of 
intellectual property rights”;31 and  
iii) ensuring that “measures and procedures to enforce 
intellectual property rights do not themselves become 
barriers to legitimate trade.”32  
																																								 																				
 27. Many of the U.S. government’s own laws affect and restrict its own actions. 
 28. TRIPS Agreement: Changing The Face Of IP Trade And Policy-Making, at 8 (2015), 
http://bit.do/changing-face-IP-trade. 
 29. DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 24-
25 (2d ed. 2003). 
 30. TRIPS, supra note 4, at pmbl. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
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The latter two, which meant strengthening the protection and 
preventing the abuse of IPRs, have developed simultaneously with the 
accepted opinion about “compromises with regard to achieving various 
objectives.”33 However, there is no indication of which concern is of 
primary importance. Even the first target alludes to compromise, but 
keeps silent about it. In other words, the mutually contradictory 
measures both for protecting and preventing the abuse of IPR help to 
reduce distortions and impediments to international trade. Therefore, 
two seemingly simple de lege but complex de facto issues arise. Firstly, 
which of the targets between protecting and preventing the abuse of 
IPR should be paramount since all original participants in the TRIPS 
negotiations need to benefit from something in the IP package? 
Secondly, how should a pragmatic balance of these two tenets for 
protecting or preventing the abuse of IPR be maintained to promote 
international trade?  
As stated above, the United States’ IPR protection and 
enforcement regimes are among the world’s most systematic and 
effective, and therefore special international attention has been paid to 
the United States’ strong protection of IPRs. At present, it is no 
exaggeration to say that the United States is in the vanguard of 
international protection and enforcement of IPRs. With its 
technological leadership, the United States’ IP-intensive industries 
have, since the 1980s, been the backbone of its national economy, and 
therefore its IP-intensive industries would be subject to material injury 
unless strong multilateral mechanisms for IP protection and 
enforcement are established. 
Although compromise, concession, and flexibility are, to a limited 
extent, relevant in the context of the different international negotiations 
and consultations, strengthening the protection of IPRs was both the 
starting point and the ultimate aim during the United States’ 
participation in the TRIPS negotiations.34 In the TRIPS negotiations, 
an essential requirement of the United States was that access to the U.S. 
market depended on whether the exporting country had provided 
effective and adequate protection of IPRs.35 Naturally, this requirement 
was based on the United States’ own domestic IP-related acts. Here, 
we take the Special 301 under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988 (“the Special 301”) as an example.  
The Special 301 Report identifies those countries that “deny 
adequate and effective protection for intellectual property rights or 
																																								 																				
 33. Field, supra note 3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 133-34. 
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deny fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons who rely on 
intellectual property protection.”36 Specifically, it focuses on 
monitoring trademarks, including geographical indications (“GI”), 
counterfeiting and copyright piracy; digital, internet, and broadcast 
piracy; government use of software; and trademark and domain name 
disputes.37 The first Special 301 Report concerning the weakness of 
some trading partners in IP protection was issued on May 25, 1989.38 
More seriously, the guideline of strong IPR protection and enforcement 
on bilateral and multilateral bases have thereafter been made perfectly 
clear, the reasons thereof being declared as follows:  
As a result of this extensive review, the [United States Trade 
Representative (“USTR”)] concluded that no foreign country 
currently meets every standard for adequate and effective 
intellectual property protection as set forth in the U.S. 
proposal on intellectual property tabled in the Uruguay 
Round.  
Thus the USTR has determined that all countries are eligible 
for potential priority designation based on the standards of the 
U.S. Uruguay Round proposal, because all countries “deny 
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property 
rights” within the meaning of the statute.39  
The United States has fired the shot heard all around the world via 
the Special 301. In 2013 and 2014, a total of 177 trading partners of the 
United States were reviewed and 76 thereof were placed on the Priority 
Watch List and the Watch List, according to the USTR’s 25th annual 
Special 301 Report.40 Also, there were 37 and 34 countries identified 
on the Priority Watch List and the Watch List in 2015 and 2016, 
respectively.41 It could be argued that, with the aggressive stance taken 
by the United States in applying the Special 301 and the Special 301 
Out-of-Cycle Review of Notorious Markets,42 no country can escape 
																																								 																				
 36. 2016 Special 301 Review: Identification of Countries Under Section 182 of the Trade 
Act of 1974: Request for Public Comment and Announcement of Public Hearing, 81 Fed. Reg. 
1,277 (Jan. 11, 2016). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Press Release, United States Trade Representative, USTR Fact Sheet: “Special 301” 
On Intellectual Property (May 25, 1989), http://bit.do/USTRfactsheet (last visited Nov. 22, 2017). 
 39. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  
 40. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1, at 99. 
 41. These trading partners in the Priority Watch List in 2016 Special 301 Report include 
Algeria, Argentina, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Russia, Thailand, Ukraine and 
Venezuela. See generally 2016 U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE SPECIAL 301 REP. 3 (Apr. 2016); 
Kevin E. Noonan, U.S. Trade Representative Issues 2017 Special 301 Report, PATENT DOCS 
(May 4, 2017), http://bit.do/Patent-Docs-2017special301rep. 
 42. Trade Policy Review, supra note 1, at 99.  
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the USTR’s discovery of IPR infringement, even though some aspects, 
for instance trading retaliation mechanism contained in the Special 
301, may be inconsistent with WTO obligations, as analyzed in Section 
III.B, below.43  
With the Special 301 being such an effective instrument targeted 
at closing the links between the U.S. domestic market access for goods 
and effective IPR regimes in exporting countries, the United States 
stalwartly pursued its goals and requirements for IP protection and 
enforcement, evaluated its partners’ IP protection regimes, and 
established whether a country’s acts, policies, or practices provided 
adequate and effective IP protection and enforcement.44 One fact has 
been clear—namely, that speeding up the multilateral negotiations of 
enforcement disciplines on protection of IPRs would be of critical 
importance for restraining the United States from taking unilateral 
action against its opponents’ IP violations. To be brief, TRIPS “is 
aimed at preventing unilateral actions.”45 As a matter of fact, with the 
application of these unilateral actions against, for instance, Singapore, 
the Republic of Korea, Brazil, and China,46 all of which were lately 
involved in the TRIPS negotiations, the United States effectively 
improved its negotiating position, and it has become widely recognized 
that access to the U.S. market for IP-intensive goods will be denied if 
any country lacks restrictive IPR protection and enforcement under its 
domestic legal regime.  
Of the IPR protection in some developing countries, it may be said 
that these countries are forced by circumstance to take some part in the 
TRIPS negotiations, and they had to incorporate strong IP 
protection into their own IPR laws, policies, and practices. Brazil, for 
instance, encountered the U.S. unilateral trade sanctions on October 20, 
1988, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1973, after President 
Reagan appealed for the launch of a new round of IP-covered 
multilateral trade negotiations in 1986.47 With the allegation of an IPR 
infringement, the United States attempted to, on the one hand, coerce 
Brazil to strengthen its IPR protection legislation and, on the other, 
																																								 																				
 43. See also Suzanne Zhou, Challenging the Use of the U.S. Special 301 Procedures 
Against Developing Country Access to Medicines Policies – Indian Pharmaceutical Patents and 
the WTO 9 (Sept. 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://bit.do/Zhou-
Challengingtheuse. 
 44. Field, supra note 3, at 133. 
 45. Carlos M. Correa, The TRIPS Agreement: How Much Room for Maneuver?, 2 J. HUM. 
DEV. 79, 80 (2001). 
 46. Field, supra note 3, at 132. 
 47. Id. 
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improve its own negotiating position, above all that related to TRIPS.48 
This seeming coincidence fully proved the United States’ intention and 
objective of strengthening the IPR protection by means of entering into 
a multilateral IPR agreement (later which came to be TRIPS). The 
Hobbes doctrine49 of defense by applying the pressure of absolute 
sovereignty in U.S. foreign policy was again fully manifested.  
The current TRIPS agreement covers the major contents provided 
in a proposal by the United States in October 1988 on requirements for 
IPR protection and enforcement.50 This proposal, together with those 
subsequently set forth by the European Community (“E.C.”) (the 
predecessor of the European Union (“E.U.”)), Japan, Switzerland, and 
Australia, constitutes the core substantial and structural framework.51 
What is more, one fact should not be neglected in that, seeing a lack of 
a global footprint for its time, the United States has been playing a 
leading role in the “Quad” (comprising the United States, Canada, the 
E.C., and Japan) and “the Friends of Intellectual Property Group” 
(including the “Quad”, Switzerland, and so on) in the history of TRIPS 
negotiations, after all these countries held similar views and intended 
to develop a shared set of strict multilateral regimes on IPR protection 
and enforcement.52 There have been many examples which prove this. 
For instance, the E.C. concretely proposed the use of trade sanctions 
for IP-related breaches at the meeting of December 11, 12, and 14, 
1989. These proposals read in part that: 
[i]t was therefore necessary to provide for the possibility of 
meaningful sanctions in cases where other measures had 
proved insufficient to solve a dispute. The Community 
proposal therefore suggested that, in conformity with Article 
XXIII of the General Agreement, such sanctions could 
include the possible suspension by a contracting party of the 
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application of any concession or other obligation under the 
GATT, as determined to be appropriate by the Contracting 
Parties.53 
IP compulsory licenses are another example. Such conditions for 
enforcing compulsory licences as “public non-commercial use,” 
“national emergency,” and “circumstances of extreme urgency” were 
proposed by, inter alia, the United States, the E.C., Japan, and 
Switzerland.54 In addition, improving the transparency in deciding 
whether to grant a compulsory license or not was pursued and was a 
shared objective of these developed countries.55 Limitations on the use, 
scope, duration, and so forth were well established as chief disciplines 
for the implementation of compulsory licenses. This further 
identified that IPR “protection” is distinctly a core concept that runs 
through the whole of the TRIPS negotiations.  
Inevitably, there are certain exceptions. For example, an 
important patent protection principle of first-to-file did not enter the 
TRIPS agreement only because of the requirement of making a basic 
change of the ongoing principle of first-to-use in the U.S. patent 
regime.56 Exceptions from patentable subject are another example. The 
E.C., Switzerland, and Japan are three developed members proposing 
common exceptions from patentable subject matter, and the current 
TRIPS agreement also explicitly lays down these exceptions in Article 
27 (entitled “Patentable Subject Matter”), under Section 5 (entitled 
“Patent”).57 However, the United States was not included in the group 
raising the proposal for the common exceptions. Furthermore, because 
these exceptions had received overwhelming support, the United States 
placed great emphasis on preventing the abuse of these exceptions 
through crafting the negotiated TRIPS text, and this was fully contrary 
to the E.C.’s, Switzerland’s, and Japan’s support for the exceptions.58 
In any case, when it comes to the IPR issue, the United States’ top 
priority is to strengthen IPR protection.59  
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At this point, we can answer the question raised at the outset of 
this Section: under TRIPS, which is more important between the 
following—IPR protection or preventing the IPR abuse through 
compulsory licensing? We respond that the former is more important 
than the latter. Article 1 of TRIPS, entitled “Nature and Scope of 
Obligations” provides a more positive answer, which reads in part: 
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their 
law more extensive protection than is required by this 
Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene 
the provisions of this Agreement. Members shall be free to 
determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system 
and practice.60 
As a rule, the word “shall,” as opposed to “may,” legally identifies 
a compulsory obligation.61 The special alternatives of “may” or “shall” 
in Article 15 (entitled “Protectable Subject Matter”) and in Article 16 
(entitled “Rights Conferred”) of TRIPS have further demonstrated the 
nature of strong protection under the TRIPS mechanism. In other 
words, obtaining trademark status is not limited to the precondition of 
registration in accordance with the “may” provisions. Reading between 
the lines, we find that “protection” of the trademark is no doubt the sole 
tenet per se, whether using the word “shall” or “may”.	
Article 15 reads in part that: 
Where signs are not inherently capable of distinguishing the 
relevant goods or services, Members may make registrability 
depend on distinctiveness acquired through use.  
. . . 
Members may make registrability depend on use. However, 
actual use of a trademark shall not be a condition for filing an 
application for registration. An application shall not be 
refused solely on the ground that intended use has not taken 
place before the expiry of a period of three years from the date 
of application.62  
And, Article 16 reads in part that: 
The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive 
right to prevent all third parties not having the owner’s 
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2017] REVISITING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DILEMMA 167 
consent from using in the course of trade identical or similar 
signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to 
those in respect of which the trademark is registered where 
such use would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case of 
the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a 
likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.63 
It goes without saying that now the IPRs have been much more 
closely linked de jure with “protection” than with “compulsory 
license.” This result stemmed from the special preference of the United 
States and other like-minded countries with a determined IP-protection 
ideal. Originally, antitrust and competition law is the natural enemy of 
the monopoly of knowledge or the abuse of IPR, but from the United 
States’ perspective, the lack of transparency, predictability, and well-
accepted standards for applying IPR leaves the U.S. IPR holder 
“vulnerable.”64 
This kind of increasingly popular “protectionist” view even has a 
fundamental impact on the ruling of the WTO dispute settlement body 
(“DSB”). In India – Patents (U.S.), the Appellate Body actually 
referred to the above-mentioned three objectives in the TRIPS 
preamble in its interpretation of Article 70.8(a) of TRIPS, as follows: 
The Panel’s interpretation here is consistent also with the 
object and purpose of the TRIPS Agreement. The Agreement 
takes into account, inter alia, “the need to promote effective 
and adequate protection of intellectual property rights.”65  
“Inter alia” is defined as “among other things” or “especially”.66 
One question remains: why did the Appellate Body circumvent the 
third target, i.e., the prohibition of the abuse of IPRs or the IP 
compulsory licensing? 
Expressed concisely, the “strong protection” of IPRs has 
developed along the line of stringent IPR protection and enforcement 
under the United States’ and other like-minded countries’ guidance. 
There is no doubt that the implementation of the TRIPS agreement 
implies that the United States successfully pursued its IP protectionist 
objective on a multilateral basis. Logically, the TRIPS agreement has 
helped the United States to “align with international norms” with its 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.67 
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II. CONFLICTS BETWEEN STRONG AND SOFT IPR PROTECTION 
MODES 
As far as the conflicts between the strong protection of IPR and 
the weak one are concerned, we will examine the relationship between 
the IPR protection and enforcement and the multilateral DSM under 
the GATT 1994. More specifically, the conflicts in the field of IP-
related retaliation and cross-retaliation under the DSM reflect such an 
international reality that the strong protection and enforcement of IPRs 
is not the only policy choice. 
A. Conflicts in the Field of IP-Related Retaliation under the 
WTO/DSM 
Concerning the issue of IP-related retaliation, there is a very 
controversial story among the United States, India, and New Zealand.  
1. The United States 
As mentioned above, the United States strongly favor the link 
between the U.S. domestic market access for IP-intensive products and 
the IP-protection conditions in exporting countries.68 Therefore, the 
United States strongly adheres to the TRIPS provisions under the DSU, 
including, inter alia, the rules and procedures relating to the suspension 
of concession or other obligations, e.g., retaliation.  
2. India 
India has stressed that IP disputes can only be negotiated for 
settlement rather than for implementing trade retaliation. India even 
tended to take the same route as that mentioned in the polemical book 
Against Intellectual Monopoly,69 in which Boldrin and Levine 
pungently criticized contemporary patent and copyright regimes as “an 
unnecessary evil” and called for systematic reform.70 Without 
intending to advance the IPR dispute settlement matters more 
generally, India inclined to defend exclusive IPR and to encourage free 
riding, and thereby encourage the contraction of R&D investments, or, 
say, have “virtually no research conducted by its pharmaceutical 
industry after a 1970 law.” India also has weak patent protection,71 even 
if there is a well-known opinion that new, follow-up products always 
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mean significant improvements in quality and immense economic 
benefits.72 
3. New Zealand 
Comparatively, at the time, New Zealand just focused on “floating 
some ideas that could bridge the differences”73 and proposed that all 
the IP-related trade retaliations involving non-compliance with DSB 
recommendations and rulings should solely be endorsed by the TRIPS 
Committee, a special deliberating body for IP dispute settlement 
architecture going beyond the current WTO’s DSM.74 Getting to the 
bottom of the proposal raised by New Zealand, one may find that it 
reflected the very protectionist nature for IPRs, namely, “an ex ante 
incentive for maximizing expression and innovation,”75 or the proper 
incentives for creating and inventing76 within the limitation of IPRs 
itself as well as its derivative rights and within an ascertained period.  
Different from the mode of strong IPR protection implemented in 
the United States, the soft one like New Zealand’s never overlooked 
the factors that warrant IPR protection based not only on the public 
interest in a broad sense but also on maintaining the creative and 
reputational interests of the IPR holders.77 The latter interests are also 
the core pragmatic rewards of the creator’s labor. Actually, in such a 
global IP-intensive competitive environment, free riding is not 
sustainable whether de lege or de facto. Those WTO Members who 
place emphasis on the soft IP protection (like India) face a common 
issue—namely, that their IP strategy should be “upgraded” in the future 
because the moral foundation of strong IPR protection has been 
pursued by the United States, the E.U., and others who have numerous 
IP-intensive industries, such that “[e]veryone has the right to the 
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protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.”78 
B. Conflicts in the Field of the IP-related Cross-Retaliation 
under the DSM 
Cross-retaliation under the DSM is a much more threatening 
weapon. In contrast, cross-retaliation under the DSU is limited to 
three sectors—namely, goods, services, and IPs, in accordance with 
Article 22(3) of DSU.79 Trading retaliation measures based on these 
three sectors are mutually equivalent and reciprocal. For instance, once 
cross-retaliation is authorized by the DSB against the U.S. trading 
restrictions on certain imports, the compulsory licensing of some U.S. 
patents could also be legally chosen as one of the effective means of 
retaliation. In other words, the retaliation instrument of IPR limitations 
could be applied against market access limitations, e.g., an anti-
dumping, countervailing, or safeguarding measure. In fact, there is a 
precedent for this although it is subject to the lack of specific, 
procedural, and substantial rules—which aim to evaluate the 
equivalence between the market access forbidding measure and IPRs 
utilized as retaliation tool—and how to withdraw the IP license benefits 
because of the opponent’s failure to implement market access 
obligations under the GATT 1994 and the subsequent DSB arbitration 
award of non-compliance. Retaliation by way of “goods for IPRs” 
(“goods–IPRs”) could be deemed to be irrational or even somewhat 
ludicrous, because most of the WTO members have been accustomed 
to the “IPRs for goods” (“IPRs-goods”) tit-for-tat mode—not the 
opposite “goods for IPRs” approach under the United States’ 
continuous crusade to strengthen IPR protection since the 1970s. More 
importantly, almost all of the developing country members do not have 
sufficient, effective, and ingenious IPR resources to carry out goods–
IPRs retaliation.80  
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It is noteworthy that there are seven categories of IPRs under the 
current TRIPS. They cover patent, copyright, trademark, geographical 
indication, industrial design, layout design of integrated circuits, and 
unclosed information.81 Therefore, the numerous IP sources will 
unavoidably complicate the issue of choosing the most suitable IPR 
retaliation. Assessment of the corresponding amount and duration of IP 
retaliation as well as identification of the level of the nullification or 
impairment caused by the original IP infringement are no easy tasks.82 
Further, the retaliation sectors under Article 23(3)(g) of the TRIPS 
agreement are applied to goods-, services-, and trade-related IPRs. 
However, even the IPRs–IPRs retaliation itself cannot feasibly be 
operated within the same TRIPS agreement.83  
III. STRONG IPR PROTECTION: A TOUGH NUT TO CRACK 
Many problems stem from limitations, and the simple ex parte 
limitation is infeasible. This observation may help to explain the fact 
that the strong protection of IPRs, as discussed above, has not always 
been a popular, widely-held position in the whole development process 
of the U.S. IPR regime. Certain IP-related acts, regulations, or 
practices—such as the Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”), 
which by its very nature involves strong protection—are also the 
disputed ones. According to the CTEA, individual copyright holders 
are granted an extra 20 years and thus a total of 70 years after their 
death for the protection for their works.84 This extension does not 
certainly stimulate creativity by promoting social justice. It safeguards 
the legal needs of future creators; it has therefore been criticized 
because “it has contributed to the copyright thicket that complicates an 
author’s efforts to use old copyrighted sources in a way that goes 
beyond the parameters of fair use.”85  
Moreover, although the U.S. government had made 
a robust defense of IPRs within its borders, it is obvious that the U.S. 
policy of strengthening IPR protection measures is a tough nut to crack. 
The issue of “patent trolls” is a clear example of how strong IPR 
protection has seriously retarded innovation and creativity. What patent 
trolls do is purchase the patent rights, especially to license them or to 
initiate patent infringement claims plainly based on a monetization 
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scheme, without the intent to innovate and create, much less improve 
social welfare considerations.86 In this respect, the monopoly sourcing 
from the exorbitant IPR protection is a “cancer” that needs to be 
abolished without delay.87 Lao Tzu (circa 571–471 B.C.) said: “[i]f we 
cease to set store by products that are [tough] to get, there will be no 
more thieves. If the people never see such things as excite desire, their 
hearts will remain placid and undisturbed.”88 It seems therefore that the 
soft protection of IPR is also a reasonable alternative.89 
The soft IPR protection herein, which places more emphasis on 
the protection of the consumers’ or the public’s interests, may be called 
the balanced development approach of the international IPR system,90 
which is in full compliance with the provisions in the TRIPS 
agreement. For instance, Section 8 of TRIPS, entitled “Control of Anti-
Competitive Practices in Contractual Licences,” takes note of the fact 
or the possibility that IP licensing practices or conditions restrain 
competition and thereby produce adverse effects on trade and impede 
the transfer and dissemination of technology. Article 40(2) of TRIPS 
further stipulates that:  
[a]s provided above, a Member may adopt, consistently with 
the other provisions of this Agreement, appropriate measures 
to prevent or control such practices, which may include for 
example exclusive grant back conditions, conditions 
preventing challenges to validity and coercive package 
licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of 
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the Member.91 
As a de facto multilateral guideline on the establishment, 
implementation, and development of international IP regimes, this 
provision also specially considers the elimination of the IP barriers of 
different countries. The “Zhong’yong Zhi Dao”92 (i.e., “a middle 
course”) approach in IPR protection is extremely necessary. The 
viewpoint herein is firmly supported by an argument that “although 
stronger IPR protection directly increases the incentive to innovate, it 
also discourages innovation in the long run by suppressing the process 
of ‘learning by doing.’ . . . This implies that both very strong and very 
weak IPR policies decrease innovation, so a moderate approach is 
preferable.”93 
Furthermore, more challenges arise in overturning the decisions 
that reflect the WTO members’ broad interests. As is widely known, 
the WTO commonly makes its decisions by consensus.94 TRIPS has 
placed the developing country members in something of a dilemma. 
Cross-retaliation with potential threat of IPRs–goods mode under the 
TRIPS is one thing and the United States’ possible bilateral sanction 
but for the TRIPS agreement is another.95 Thus, under this proposed 
“middle course” approach, we can speculate that the TRIPS agreement 
reached back then would face hurdles at attaining concensus. After all, 
the developing country members have given greater consideration and 
effect than ever before to the issues of IPR protection and 
enforcement.96 
So far, the acts, policies, and incentives that foster IPR access will 
become an integral part of the innovation regimes. IPR protection and 
enforcement might then be crafted so as to reduce barriers while 
maximizing the positive effects of IPR protection and while 
minimizing its potentially negative effects. However, strengthening the 
IPR protection and enforcement has been regarded as a top-level 
objective of the United States throughout the TRIPS negotiations and 
especially since the TRIPS agreement came into force. This 
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observation is further confirmed by the United States’ overall strategic 
goals, including the U.S. Department of Commerce strategic goals for 
2014–201897 and the strategic plan of the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office.98 The former focuses on accelerating the growth of innovation-
intensive economic sectors and promoting enhanced IP protection 
abroad while the latter sets out three goals: “optimize patent quality and 
timeliness, optimize trademark quality and timeliness, and provide 
domestic and global leadership to improve IP policy protection and 
enforcement.”99 
In the future, the United States might eventually bring about its 
own dilemma when emerging economies, such as China, Brazil, and 
India—which all frequently appear on the Priority Watch List or the 
Watch List of annual U.S. Special 301 Reports—become powerful, 
innovating countries, and these countries mirror their IPR regimes with 
the United States’.  
CONCLUSION 
The implementation of a strong IP protection mode or a soft one 
is simply a policy choice. The strong IP protection mode reflects, in a 
specific manner, national strategies focusing on developing global 
competition and meeting central demands of creativity and innovation 
in certain special economic and social developmental phases in the 
United States. In contrast, juxtapose that mode with the Office of 
USTR official website headline of “America First Trade Policy”:  
The Office of the United States Trade Representative is 
committed to ensuring that American workers are given a fair 
shot at competing across the globe. USTR is working to 
reshape the landscape of trade policy to work for all 
Americans. On a level playing field, Americans can compete 
fairly and win. This new America First trade policy will make 
it more desirable for companies to stay here, create jobs here, 
pay taxes here, and rebuild our economy. Our workers and the 
communities that support them will thrive again, as 
companies compete to set up manufacturing in the U.S., to 
hire our young people and give them hope and a real shot at 
prosperity again.100 
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In the field of IPR protection, the corresponding position was 
declared in an USTR press release dated December 12, 2016, which 
reads: 
Trademarks, copyright, patents, and trade secrets play a 
crucial role in America’s global competitiveness. IP-intensive 
industries directly account for 27.9 million high-paying jobs 
and indirectly support 17.6 million more. As the Joint 
Strategic Plan makes clear, the U.S. will continue to pursue 
high global standards in protection and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.101 
It is apparent that strong IPR protection and enforcement have 
become Hobson’s choice and must be promoted. In particular, the 
Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 has been in 
force since February 24, 2016, and it lists IPR as one of “[t]he priority 
trade issue” and directs that the Office of the USTR shall now include 
one presidentially-appointed “Chief Innovation and Intellectual 
Property Negotiator,” who: 
shall . . . conduct trade negotiations and . . . enforce trade 
agreements with respect to United States intellectual property 
and . . . take appropriate actions to address acts, policies, and 
practices of foreign governments that have a significant 
adverse impact on the value of United States innovation.102 
In view that this law is designed for promoting a new “America First 
trade policy” and helps to “compete fairly and win”103 for the U.S. IP-
intensive industries, it will be undoubtedly carried out by the Trump 
Administration. The strong IPR protection in the United States will 
open a new chapter. 
However, tracing back to the founding of the United States, one 
can find yet another case. Thomas Jefferson, the principal author of the 
Declaration of Independence, said in 1813 that:  
That ideas should freely spread from one to another over the 
globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and 
improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly 
and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, 
like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their 
density in any point, and like the air in which we breathe, 
move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement 
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or exclusive appropriation. Inventions then cannot, in nature, 
be a subject of property. Society may give an exclusive right 
to the profits arising from them, as an encouragement to men 
to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or 
may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the 
society, without claim or complaint from anybody.104 
Attention should be paid to the use of “may” but not “shall” in the 
last sentence. With the emergence and development of the American 
innovation economy, great changes in principle have taken place in its 
IPR laws, policies, and practices.  
In a metaphorical sense, thought is the head of the times. Indeed, 
where there is a will, there is a way. TRIPS is by any means a very 
mixed bag filled with an enormous amount of multilateral provisions 
for strong IPR protection and enforcement stemming from the United 
States. The deterrent for offenders of IPR compulsory licensing is far 
less than that of the U.S.’s four swords105—the Generalized System of 
Preference (GSP), Section 301, Special 301, and 337 Investigations—
while the spirit linking market access with the conditions of IPR 
protection and enforcement embodied by the four protecting 
instruments has been fully incorporated into the TRIPS agreement. 
Therefore, IPR protection continues to be the strongest point under the 
current international IPR system. 
The formation of the strong protectionist characteristics of the 
ongoing international IPR regime is rooted in, on the one hand, 
international pressure from the United States, the E.U., and on the 
other, developed WTO members, which now have made 
a robust defense of strengthening IPR protection and enforcement. On 
the other hand, the internal incentive to pursue technical innovation is 
supported by invention patents and creative expression in some WTO 
members. Of course, protecting intellectual property is also a morally-
driven notion during the socioeconomic development of different 
WTO members. Exclusive rights accorded to the owners of IPR are 
important instruments for guaranteeing the returns on their creative 
activities. The U.S. preferential objective of IP protection and 
enforcement reflects the desire for tough disciplinary measures to 
address IP infringement but, in no case, to encourage the flexibility in 
setting out the level of protection or compulsory licensing for IPRs. 
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What should be mentioned is that Canada is a member of both the 
“Quad” advocating strong IPR protection and “the Friends of 
Intellectual Property Group” in the process of TRIPS negotiation, as 
mentioned above in Section II.B. This indicates that Canada has been 
playing the same central role as the United States in facilitating the IPR 
multilateral protection. Unfortunately, the Office of the USTR always 
designates Canada as a Priority Foreign Country (“PFC”), and has 
continuously placed Canada on the Priority Watch List (2009–2012) or 
the Watch List (2002–2008, 2013–2016) in the Special 301 Report 
since 2002.106 This is an astonishing fact, considering that the Special 
301 Report is “the result of an extensive multi-stakeholder process”107 
“following extensive research and analysis”108 and only a country 
having “the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices and 
whose acts, policies, or practices have the greatest adverse impact 
(actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. products”109 can be named as 
a PFC and qualified as a trading partner taking a position on the Priority 
Watch List or the Watch List. It therefore seems that the U.S.’s strong 
IPR protection system is harsh enough. As far as most less-advanced 
country members of the WTO are concerned, their own IPR protection 
and enforcement regime still has a long way to go to be in consonance 
with the U.S. requirement of providing “high levels of protection.”  
Bob Dylan, an American singer-songwriter who was awarded the 
2016 Nobel Prize in Literature,110 wrote a thought-provoking song 
entitled “Blowing in the Wind.” The first two lines of its lyrics read as 
follows: “How many roads must a man walk down before you call him 
a man? How many seas must a white dove sail before she sleeps in the 
sand?” 
If these two questions were asked in the IPR-related context, the 
answer would be: when the leading country has been finally successful 
in catching up with its destined target in view of current global 
unbalanced innovation infrastructure and economic development. 
Anyway, it is rational to conclude that “a country’s IPR regime likely 
coevolves with its economy” and that “countries try to alter their IPR 
regime in response to changing needs.”111 Whether the IPR regime is 
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perfect or not does not depend on the purpose and objective expressed 
with such ambiguous wordings as “adequate and effective,” “fair and 
equitable,” or “having adverse effects on trade or competition,” but on 
its acceptable degree in practice. Seeing the laborious progress of the 
Doha Round Agenda over a long period of time,112 it will be of 
exemplary significance if the current TRIPS reforms will escape the 
dilemma which focuses on strong IPR protection and enforcement. 
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